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Movement in the Powerhouse Excavation Saguling Project, Indonesia
George F. Sowers
Senior Vice President, Law Engineering, Atlanta, Georgia
Regents Professor Emeritus, Georgia Institute of Technology,
Atlanta, Georgia

SYNOPSIS: Ground expansion and finally sliding occurred in one corner of the 25 m deep open
excavation for the powerhouse. The movement occurred in a slickensided claystone overlain by water
bearing sandy gravel. The cause was expansion of the claystone followed by its weakening from water
pressure in the open slickensided cracks.
The excavation was finally stabilized by drainage plus
reinforced sloping walls restrained by cable anchors in the rock below.
The paper summarizes the
pertinent soil and rock properties and describes the analyses of the movements, the corrective
measures and their varied performance, an9 the professional lessons to be gained.
INTRODUCTION
The S aguling project is the largest
hydroelectric plant in the Republic of
Indonesia.
It is in West Java, about 100 km
southeast of the Capital, Jakarta, and about
40 Km west of Bandung, a large industrial and
commercial center. The Citurum River rises in
a ring of volcanic mountains in West Java.
The mountains interrupt the flow of moist air
from the Indian Ocean and producing high
rainfall within the Citurum watershed. The 98
m high dam creates the reservoir just upstream
of the river's fall through a narrow canyon
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Profile of the Citurum River

between mountain ridges on its way to the sea.
The water is directed around the canyon in
twin tunnels 6 km long, down a mountainside in
twin penstocks in a cut as deep as 25 m ( 82
ft}, and into the Powerhouse, developing 385 m
(1270 ft} of head.
The installed generating
capacity is 700 megawatts ini tial.ly with a
potential. capacity of 1400 megawatts in
peaking power.
The river profile is shown in
Fig. 1.
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Fig. 2

Layout of Principal Project Components

The major project components are the river
diversion tunnels, the
rockfill dam with an
earth core, waterway tunnels, surge tanks
steel penstocks, power house, and switchyard.
They extend for about 8 km across low
mountains and narrow valleys occupied by rice
fields, teak plantations, and occasional
jungle, with numerous small villages connected
by narrow winding roads.
The principal
component layout is shown in Fig. 2.
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The combination of complex formations makes it
difficult to accurately characterize the soils
and rocks and to analyze stability. Similarly
the environmental changes causing weathering
and pore pressure increases are difficult to
Therefore, all of the stability
quantify.
problems were not anticipated in project
design .

..;onstruction required roads for access and
housing for personnel, beginning during site
continuing through
exploration and
construction and eventually for project
operation.
The design was largely complete in mid 1980
af.ter about 5 years of planning and
Construction commenced in
investigation .
September 1981 and was virtually complete in
The project has been generating power
1985.
for more than two years, and is a key
component of the national electric power
company, PLN.

Objective of Paper
Despite the geologic and environmental
conditions it has been possible to identify
some of the complexities after failure has
occurred and to determine how to avoid similar
Although instability
problems in the future.
accompanied excavation at many project
locations, this paper is limited to
instability in the Powerhouse excavation. The
failures have been previously described by
The purpose of this
Maru and Shaw, 1984.
paper is to describe the movements, evaluate
the difficulties with their evaluation, and to
show what changes are needed in our
engineering methods to improve our technology.

Geotechnical Problems During Construction
Both the site geology and climate present
problems for engineering design and
Most were anticipated and
construction.
However,
overcome without incidents.
landslides were an intermittent hazard to
construction works and a cause of construction
delay and additional cost.
The site geology is complex. Most of the site
formations have a volcanic origin. Many are
intrusions and indurated volcanic ash; others
are sediments derived from the erosion and
redeposition of volcanic/materials in the sea
or in a shallow lake basin between the
The formations are comparatively
mountains.
young: the oldest of Tertiary age and the
youngest contemporary accumulations of silt
from the muddy streams and volcanic ash from
still active nearby volcanoes.
There is local limestone of Tertiary Age
formed during periods of land subsidence that
alternated with violent uplifts of the land.
Tectonic forces produced folding and tilting
of these young formations, with some of these
forces remaining to confound engineers and
Because of recent tectonic
geologists.
movements, many of the more brittle tuffs and
similar rocks contain networks of cracks.
These are both surfaces of weakness and
confined aquifers in which water pressure
reduces effective normal stress and shear
resistance.

Fig. 3

The climate is hostile, particularly to land
stability and durability of engineered
construction. The average rain of 2320 mm or
91 in. comes largely during the 6 month wet
season, beginning in late November and ending
Rainfall can be extremely
in April or May.
intense, including violent thunderstorms. The
dry season alternates between periods of no
rain of several weeks long periods of
predominately dry weather with occasional
As a result humidity
short wet periods.
ranges from moderate to very high, and
fluctuates rapidly during the dry season.

THE POWERHOUSE SITE
The Powerhouse is a narrow flood plain and
alluvial terrace on the right bank of the
river, where the canyon broadens and the slope
The river surface is normally El.
decreases.
253 m {835 ft), the flood plain, El. 255, and
the terrace El. 265, 12 m or 40 ft above the
Just south of the site a narrow
river.
irregular limestone ridge with steep slopes is
The ridge crest i.s about
cut by the ri.ver.
200 m or 660 ft south of the Powerhouse and it
rises to about El. 395, 130 m or 430 ft above
To the north, the land slopes
the terrace.
steeply upward to about El. 700 or 2310 ft.
The waterway tunnels exit on this slope and
feed twin steel penstock tubes which drop
Figure 3
northwestward i.nto the powerhouse.
shows the excavati.on looking north from the
lower penstock toward the limestone ridge.

The temperature is uniformly high, 30 to 35 C
during the day and 18 to 20 C at night.
Because of the high rainfall and warm
temperature, rock weathering occurs rapidly.
The near surface soils and rock either remain
saturated or become saturated during the rainy
Standing water in rice fields and
season.
irrigation of all crops during the dry season
aggravates the water problems.
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The Powerhouse Excavation Looking
Northwest with the Limestone Ridge
in the Background, January 1983,
with the Anchored Concrete
Restraining System under
Construction
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Fig. 4

obvious fissile structure.
The clay minerals
are dominantly kaolinite and illite. Deeper
horizons of the claystone are calcareous, and
contain some montmorillonite.
The plasticity
of the remolded reworked claystone is low, and
is classified as CL, even those horizons
containing montmorillonite.
The stratum is
firm to hard with unconfined compressive
strengths of 5 to 45 kg/em •
The cores show
the claystone to be cut by numerous fissures,
with random orientations and spacings of
between 10 and 100 em.
Many of the fissures
are slickensided, as illustrated in Fig. 7.

Powerhouse Plan

The Powerhouse plan is shown in Fig. 4 and a
typical cross section through one of the
turbine-generator units in Fig. 5.
Its long
wall is parallel to the river.
The penstocks
enter the site from the southeast corner,
bifurcate and turn toward the river. In order
to minimize cavitation the turbine scroll
cases are well below river level.
This
required excavation to EL. 232 m, 33 m or 109
ft below the terrace for the draft tubes and
to El. 240, 25 m or about 83 ft below the
terrace for the general excavation including
the penstocks.
WEST

Fi?· 5

Contract Design for Excavation Cross
Section

EAST

Fig. 7

Powerhouse Cross Section

Soil and Rock Conditions

Slickensided Claystone from Vicinity
of the October 1982 Slide

Beneath the claystone is a soft limestone also
of Tertiary Age.
It has the strength of poor
concrete, and is relatively massive with few
fissures.

The soil and rock conditions were explored by
seismic refraction profiles, boring with
intermittent soil samples and continuous rock
coring, and shallow test pits.
Laboratory
tests for index properties of soil and for the
strength of the rock cores were made to define
engineering properties for project design.
Geologic cross sections were prepared showing
the elevations of the strata boundaries for
both design and construction planning.

The boundary between the terrace and claystone
dips down gently toward the river to the west.
The boundary between the claystone and
limestone dips down to the east and south, so
the claystone rapidly thickens in that
direction.

Fig. 6 is a typical excavation cross section,
from the contract drawings, depicting three
distinct strata.
A sandy gravel terrace,
about 10 m thick is uppermost. It consists of
cobble to fine gravel-size rounded particles
of limestone, sandstone, and some volcanics,
with a matrix of sand and partially bonded by
silt and clay.
Below is
massive claystone,
15 to 30 m thick.
It is well indurated,
apparently by consolidation, but without an

The limestone ridge appears to be supported on
the claystone with the boundary between the
two materials dipping gently to the southeast.
Discrepancies in formational boundaries to the
north and east suggest some faulting.
However, the fault surface has not been
identified.
By way of contrast with the
deeper limestone, the ridge contains numerous
steeply dipping fissures which have been
enlarged by solution and are filled with soft
red residual silty clay.
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Ground Water
The ground water table is typically in
lower sandy gravel about 2 to 4 m above
claystone, and slopes downward toward
river. It is fed by rainfall infiltration
by springs that exit along the base of
limestone ridge at its contact with
claystone below.

The contract drawings depict the powerhouse
excavation to be sloping with intermediate
berms as shown in Fig. 6. The cut faces were
to be restrained during construction by
concrete facings anchored into the claystone
and the limestone.
After the structures were
complete, the excavation was to be backfilled
and the anchored facings would have no further
·function. The basis for the design slopes and
the anchoring is not given, but it is presumed
that the claystone and limestone strengths
included with the contract documents .were
considered.

the
the
the
and
the
the

Excavation Requirements
The designers adapted the site elevations to
the harder lower claystone and the limestone
in order to provide a sufficiently rigid
foundation for the power house machinery. The
optimization of support and excavation
dictated the powerhouse orientation. However,
with the limestone falling off to the
southeast, deep excavation was required in the
upper claystone for the penstocks where they
entered the powerhouse.

Contractors Excavation Plan
The contractor's excavation plan differed
somewhat from that of the designer.
First,
the level of the terrace surface, El. 265 m,
was extended to the north 70 m or 230 ft by
cutting into the south face of the limestone

(
LIMESTONE
HILL
ROCK
CRUSHER

HILL

0

100ft

NOTE: EXCAVATION SLOPES AND BERMS
FOR SEPTEMBER SHOWN: ACTUAL SLOPES
A FEW m TO SOUTH IN MAY

LEGEND
-CRACK

Tn"r
DOWN

Fig. 8

CRACK,
VERTICAL
DISPLACEMENT

The May 1982 Cracking and Bulging
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ridge to provide a space for an aggregate
crusher, stockpiles, and the concrete batch
plant.
This required cutting a near vertical
face as deep as 20 m into the limestone.
Second, the excavation perimeter was enlarged
to provide more gentle slopes in the claystone
(2.7 H to 1 V) instead of the 1 to 1 slopes
depicted in the contract documents.
The
objective apparently was to minimize or
eliminate the need for the anchored facings.
There were no formal drawings nor engineering
computations to support these changes, but the
high unconfined compressive strengths of the
claystone, as given in the contract documents,
probably were considered.

Back analyses were made of the northeast
corner slope assuming that it had undergone
landsliding with a circular cross section.
The circle was presumed to intersect the top
of the slope at an observed crack and the toe
of the slope, as shown in Fig. 9.
The
subdivision of the claystone into two units,
slickensided and calcareous, is based on new
borings made in the cracked zone.
Unfortunately there was no evidence of a
failure surface in the continuous core
samples; the circular failure was assumed for
convenience in computation.
The ground water
levels were deduced from open wells drilled
into the slope and from observed seeps in the
slope.

MAY 1982 MOVEMENT
Description of Failure
By May 1982 the excavation had reached El. 244
m, a depth of 20.7 m or 68 ft, reaching the
upper surface of the limestone over much of
the site.
As the excavation approached this
level, extensive cracking and bulges gradually
developed in the slopes of the northeast
corner, and in the level work area further to
the north and east.
These are shown in Fig.
8.
Springs developed in the excavated slope
at the contact between the gravel terrace and
claystone.

0

Fig. 9

The cracks were tensile openings with little
or no evidence of vertical displacement. Most
were arcuate as well as discontinuous, with
their general trend parallel to the excavation
faces. The excavation faces bulged upward and
outward toward the excavation. However, there
was no evidence of overall translation of the
cracked materials in a downhill direction.

of

the

May

1982

Counter Measures
Various countermeasures were planned by the
designer after discussions with the contractor
to increase the "safety factor of 1", presumed
in the failure back-analysis, to 1.2.
These
measures included drains to reduce the ground
water level and H-piles to augment the shear
resistance of the presumed failure surface.
First, the slope was re-excavated to sounder
claystone with few cracks, as shown by the
dashed line in Fig. 9. Eleven pit wells were
excavated through the sandy gravel and about
half a meter into the claystone.
These were
built as concrete box caissons.

A search was made for more widespread
cracking. Some additional tension cracks were
found in the bench cut for the aggregate and
batch plant to the North.
Cracks with
vertical or shear displacement were found near
the top of the limestone ridges nearly 200 m
to the North, and directly above the steep
face of the limestone cut for the aggregate
and batch plant bench. Because there had been
no previous search for cracks, it is not known
whether these cracks were caused by the bench
cutting or by the powerhouse excavation.
The
evidence of insects nest in the cracks
suggests that the cracks occurred before
powerhouse excavation. The springs at the toe
of the bench excavation continued to seep
despite the end of the wet season.

Eight 250 mm or 10 in. diameter drilled wells
were installed in the northeast corner between
the excavation and the concrete plant, spaced
20-40 m apart.
These were extended 2 m into
the limestone.
Each· included a 50 mm thick
gravel pack throughout the depth to provide
for rapid infiltration. The locations of both
sets of wells are shown in Fig. 11, the plan
of the October sliding.

Analysis of Failure
New tests were made of the claystone to define
its shear strength in more detail than can be
deduced from the unconfined compression tests.
The results for saturated samples in
consolidated-un drained shear with pore
pressure measurements (effective stress) are
28
(4
15
(3

cross Section
Movements

The back analysis can be satisfied by various
combinations of ~· and c' ranging from ~'=30,
c'=0.3 kg/cm2 to ~'=15o, c'=l.O kg/cm2.
The
designers arbitrarily selected an
intermediate, conservative combination for
analysis of corrective measures: ~'=22° and
c'=0.26 kgjcm2.

Cracking to North

23 to
kg/cm2
13 to
kg/cm2

10

'---'
METERS

deg,
c'
samples)
deg,
c'
samples)

Horizontal drain holes 10 m long and 50 mm in
diameter were planned for the slopes at three
different levels to provide additional
drainage for the claystone and gravel.

0.14 to 0.31

Flattening of the slopes was considered, but
space was not available.

0.65 to 1.05
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tne res1stance o:t tne 1:1-p11es
r· ~na.l.ly,
depended on the assumed location of a sliding
surface and on adding the shear of the steel
to the shear of the soil without regard to
load transfer or strain compatibility .

The designers analyses based on the
arbitrarily selected shear parameters showed
that even with drainage, additional shear
resistance of 44 tons per meter of slope were
required for the desired computed safety
Four rows of 200 x 200 mrn (8
factor of 1.2.
(They were later
in) H piles were planned.
enlarged to 350 x 350 mm [14 in.].) The piles
would penetrate about 2 m into the limestone
to fix them against rotation. They were stiff
enough to resist bending from the resisting
force applied at the level of the assumed
circular failure surface. The number of piles
was based on adding the shear strength of the
steel at its intersection with the failure
surface, to the shear resistance of the soil.
For conservatism the number of piles required
No consideration was given to
was doubled.
pile claystone shear transfer nor strain
The locations of the pile
compatibility.
rows, two on each of the two intermediate
beams, on the re-excavated slope are shown on
Fig. 9.

OCTOBER 1982 SLIDING
Failure Description
Slow bulging and cracking continued while the
A
corrective measures were being installed.
failure occurred in the northeast corner with
rapid movement on October 18 , 1982. By way of
contrast with the May cracking , movement
developed suddenly, and included both
subsidence at the top of the slope and bulging
It commenced two days after a
at the toe .
very intense rain, following two months of
very dry weather. Fig. 11 shows the northeast
corner of the excavation, with the distortion
of the truss connecting the H-piles.

T

1 .am

5fl

~==~~1
8' H PILl!

CROSS SECTION
(REINFORCING NOT SHOWN)

Fig. 10

PLAN

H-Piles and Capping Beam

The piles on each berm were connected together
by steel angles in a simple truss and encased
in a reinforced continuous concrete beam, as
The purpose of this beam
shown in Fig. 10.
was to provide some resistance against
rotation of the tops of the piles and to
transfer loads between areas of greater and
less movement.
Fig. 11

Critigue of Correactive Measures
The analyses upon which the corrective
First, the
measures were based were flawed.
available evidence never showed that a
The ground bulged
landslide had occurred.
upward and outward, without accompanying
subsidence and with neither toe bulges nor
No shear surfaces were identified.
scarps.
Instead, the movement appeared to be the
result of soil expansion, probably with
movement along the existing slickensides, and
caused by the stress release from excavation.
Later tests showed the claystone to be
expansive, wi~h expansive pressures of more
than 2.5 kg/em •

Most of the countermeasures planned following
the May cracking and bulging had been
Installation of horizontal drains
installed.
had been temporarily stopped because they
The concrete capping
produced little water.
beam for the piles had not been constructed;
however, this beam was never considered in the
analyses for added stability .
The toe of the slope bulged outward 1 to 2 m;
the top of the slope subsided a few em,
opening and extending the previous cracks.
The major movements were in the center of the
slope where the surface moved more than 1 m
horizontally down slope, accompanied by deep
cracking and by local subsidence and upheaval,
as the claystone mass distorted.

The deep wells were too remote from the
expansion zone to effectively drain the
slickensided cracks irl. the claystone and the
pit wells could only lower the water level in
The horizontal drains planned
the gravel.
were too short and too widely spaced to drain
Worse, their
the random claystone cracks.
installation was hal ted, when only a few of
those first installed produced water .
Excavation of the loosened material steepened
the slopes and added to the stress release and
unbalanced loads in the excavation face.

The greatest vertical displacement occurred
just downhill of the upper line of H-piles.
This displacement was accompanied by a 40 m
long arcuate scarp and an open crack 50 to 100
Downhill, wedges of claystone moved
mm wide.
differentially to form an elongated graben.
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Buckling of the Truss Connecting the
H-Piles by Sliding in the Northeast
Corner of the Excavation

0
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BATCH
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•
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EL.244m
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0
0

100ft

LEGEND

•
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DRILLED WELL
PIT WELL TO
CLAYSTO NE
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TENSION CRACK

Fig. 12

Plan of the October 1982 Sliding and Earlier Drain System

A plan of the excavati on showing the cracking
and bulging in the northea st corner as well as
two smaller, unrelate d slides along the upper
west slopes is shown in Fig. 12.

There was no evidenc e of new crackin g or
movemen t at the aggrega te-concr ete plant nor
in the limeston e ridge above.
The movemen t
was confined to the northea st corner of the
excavat ion.
The area involved was smaller
than and within the area of the May cracking .

The H-piles were dragged downslop e with the
movemen t, but very non-unif ormly.
The upper
rows moved a few em and tilted downslop e only
slightly . The truss and the tops of the piles
in the lower rows moved downslop e up to 1.7 m
accompa nied by partial buckling of the truss
from bowing as shown in Fig. 11. Most of the
H-piles til ted downhil l, one 18 degrees from
the vertica l, Fig. 13a.
The H-piles offered
some resistan ce, but the clayston e cracked and
tore around them, Fig. 13b.

A few of the drain wells were producin g water,
most were not.
The water table rose 1 m
followin g the intense rain in an observa tion
well in the sliding zone, then fell slowly.
One of the shaft wells filled with water
followin g the rain and remained full several
hours before i t could be pumped down.
Unfortu nately, the caisson walls, excavate d
into the claysto ne, had no drain holes to
bleed water out of the gravel terrace aquifer.
About 1 out of 5 of the horizon tal drains
produce d water (not unusual for horizon tal
drains).

Excavat ion into the toe of the slope disclose d
a well defined failure surface.
It continue d
to move about 1 em per hour two weeks after
the major movemen t.

The H-piles did not penetra te into the
limeston e as specifie d.
Instead, they stopped
abruptl y at the top of the calcare ous
clayston e, penetra ting into it only 1 to 3 em.
This failure to drive the piles as specifie d
had been overlook ed by the designe r and was a
surprise when i t was uncovere d.

Investig ation
The site conditio ns at the time of the failure
were investig ated by the designe r and by the
Author as a consulta nt to the owner. A number
of pertinen t facts emerged .
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Swell tests were conducted of both the
Free
slickensided and calcareous claystone:
swell pressure 0.2 to 2.6
swell~ 2 to 20%;
kg/em .
The swelling in low plasticity claystone is
probably the result of residual stress. It is
likely that the slickensides and residual
stresses were caused tectonically.
Mechanism of Movements
A cross section of the October slide is shown
The earlier analyses had
in Fig. 14.
presummed a circular cross section of
movement, as shown in Fig. 9, and repeated in
Fig . 14. However, the pile tilting and ground
movement indicate that the motion was nearly
A near horizontal surface probably
linear.
followed the upper limit of the calcareous
claystone, connecting with the surface cracks
through networks of existing slickensided
cracks.
Fig. 13a

H-Pile Til ted 18 Deg from Vertical
and Heave of Claystone on Slope from
the October 1982 Slide

NORTH

SQUTH

0

••

'-----'
WeTER8

Fig. 14

Fig. 13b

First,
The movement developed in two stages.
excavation without support allowed the
claystone to expand, opening the slickensided
cracks within the mass and producing cracks in
Second, ground water and
the ground surface.
surface runoff penetrated the opened cracks,
The weakened mass
developing pressure.
expanded horizontally. Expansion was resisted
by the friction on the cracks (reduced by pore
pressure) and the resistance of the crack
The H-piles possibly prevented
asperities.
the sliding from becoming catastrophic.
However, they tore the slickensided claystone
and their lack of embedment caused them to
tilt and aggravate the cracking.

Claystone Tearing on the Downhill
Slide of an H-Pile from Slope
Movement in the October 1982 Slide

The tilt of the piles were equivalent to the
horizontal movement of their tops. This shows
that they had tilted as stiff members,
rotating about their tips, driven just into
the calcareous claystone.

Corrective Measures
Further corrective measures were designed
considering that no additional space was
available for flattening slopes and that the
construction of counter measures must be
within the capabilities of the powerhouse
contractor and Indonesian based contractors
because of the time required to mobilize
foreign contractors or to import materials.
The new data on rock expansion and the
continuing movements in the northeast slope
indicated that further expansion of the
claystone would be likely with further loss of
strength.

Added Testing
Additional soil tests were conducted on
The
samples of the slickensided claystone.
earlier tests had all been of intact
claystone, between the slickensided cracks.
The new tests were of the slickensided cracks.
There was a startling contrast with the
earlier tests: the effective friction angles
were about 12 to 15 deg with little or no
cohesion.

1574
Second International Conference on Case Histories in Geotechnical Engineering
Missouri University of Science and Technology
http://ICCHGE1984-2013.mst.edu

Cross Section of Sliding in the
Northeast Corner of the Excavation

Further movemen t was prevente d by horizon tal
wood lagging
support ed by steel H-piles
driven as cantile vers into the claysto ne
below.
System Performa nce
No signific ant movemen ts occurred in the final
support system.
The excavat ions have been
backfil led to provide level parking and
service areas around the plant.
No movemen ts
have been noted during 2 years of operatio n.
The cost of the failures and their correcti on
has not been fully identifi ed.
Beyond the
direct costs are the cost of delay and of
acceler ation.
The estimat ed total cost
Probably exceeded $10 million.

I

SECTION A·A ·
SECTIONC -c

SECTIONB -8

EL234

ANCHORED
DOUBLE
SLURRY

WALL

Fig. 15

Fig. 16

Constru cting the Anchor Concret e
Facing Walls to Support the East
Excavat ion Slopes

The Final Excavat ion Support System
CONCLUSIONS

A concret e block, initial ly restrain ed by
gravity -frictio n on the limeston e was designed
to support the northea st corner.
Tie back
tendon anchors were added when the block
moved.
Its limited resistan ce was confirme d
when the strength data on the slickens ides in
the clayston e became availab le.
Most of the
excavati on was supporte d by sloping concrete
walls restrain ed by tendon anchors into the
calcareo us clayston e and the limeston e.
At
the bottom of the south end of the excavat ion,
vertica l tied back walls were added because of
limited space.
These were installe d using
slurry supporte d excavati ons with the slurry
replace d by concret e.
These measure s are
shown on Fig. 15 and Fig. 16.

Water pressure in the slickens ided clayston e
was the cause of the moveme nts in the
powerho use excavat ion slopes.
Although the
slicke nsides were recogn ized,
their
signific ance was not understo od either by
those who identifi ed them and those who made
analyse s and designs .
Eventu ally, the
excavat ion slopes were stabiliz ed, but at
conside rable addition al cost and delay.
These failures and their correcti on provide a
number of valuable lessons for our professi on.
These include both technic al details and
broader issues of interdis ciplinar y action.
Technic al Issues

Small Slides

Small fractur es that are insign ificant
geologi cally can play a key part in soil and
rock strength .
Testing intact portions of
fracture d soil or rock is grossly mislead ing.
The strengt h and rigidit y of the mass is
largely control led by the fracture s; therefor e
testing should concent rate on these defects.

Two smaller slides occurred in the upper parts
of the excava.t ion face shortly after the
intense rain of October 13--one at the north
end of the east slope and one near the south
end of the east slope.
Their location s are
shown in Fig. 12.
Both were confined to the
sandy gravel stratum.
The cause was excess
pore water pressure and weakenin g of the dried
cla_y bonding in the terrace materia ls.
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No one informed the laboratory staff of the
s:i.gnificance of the slickensides.
Thus the
importance of the cracks fell through the
cracks between the different viewpoints of the
geologists, the laboratory engineers, and the
design engineers.
Instead, geotechnical
engineers must have an understanding of
geology and engineering geologists must have
an understanding of engineering design.
Unfortunately, :i.nterdiscipl:i.nary understanding
appears to be decl:i.ning instead of improving.
Jurisd:i.ctional jealousy between professions
can destroy all, as union labor has
demonstrated.
The combined knowledge and
wisdom of all relevant professions are
required to solve the complex problems in
geotechnical engineering.

Residual stresses play an important part in
the design of structures to support the
ground.
This has been recognized in tunnel
support engineering; i t is largely ignored in
earth pressures on walls and excavation
support systems.
The residual stress influences the design
three ways.
First, if no allowance is made
for movement, the lateral pressure can be
greater than the vertical stress produced by
soil or rock weight. Second, depending on the
rigidity of the soil or rock, considerably
more movement will be required to reduce the
lateral pressure to the active state than is
required for materials with gravity stress
alone.
Such large movements can be
intolerable in some situations.
Third, the
stress release allows existing cracks to open.
Those that were initially watertight can
accept water, allowing pore pressures to act
on the cracked surface. This changes the mass
behavior as was demonstrated in the Saguling
sliding.
Such residual stresses have been
largely ignored in geotechnical engineering,
because there have been no convenient ways to
measure them.
With the modern techniques of
hydraulic fracturing and the various
dilatometers that can be introduced in bore
holes, engineers can now measure residual
stresses and include them in their analyses.

What is economical or practical design in one
area at a particular time may not be in
another because of local resources of
manpower, money, and technology.
The H-piles
failed to restrain mudstone partially because
they could not be installed as the design
required.
The deficiency was ignored because
the contractor had no means to drive them
further.
The design must fit the resources
and capabilities of the moment.
Failure in a c:i.vil eng:i.neering is more than a
problem; it is an opportunity. Fa:i.lure is the
only full scale test of any large eng:i.neering
system.
As a test, it provides valuable
lessons to the profession.

Back .analysis of a failure must be based on
accurate information on the kinematics of that
failure.
If the presumed motion is in error,
conclusions based on an analysis of the
erroneous motion will also be wrong.
If the
nature of the movement cannot be determined,
then many possibilities must be evaluated--a
form of parametric study.
The corrective
design then is adapted to the range of
answers.

As professionals, we should take advantage of
the lessons; otherwise, the failure may be
repeated.
Moreover, we have already paid for
the lessons.
The Saguling Project has survived its
powerhouse movements and is now generating
power as its design anticipated.

Analyses of soil-structure interaction must
consider the relative rigidities and strengths
of those materials that control their
interaction. Assuming that a pile contributes
shear resistance to a landslide equivalent to
the shear strength of its steel is wrong when
it does not consider the possibility that the
pile will shear the soil instead.
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Drainage design must recognize that real
aquifers are highly variable.
The failure of
some drain holes to find water should not
discourage the installation of more drain
holes; one hole draining a key aquifer may be
sufficient.
Broader Issues
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